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I
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY
A. Free Trade and Competition
Economic integration, common markets, and customs unions can have differ-
ent objectives. Some of these institutions are predominantly "trade-diverting", to
use Jacob Viner's phrase; they create a closed association for the protection of
higher-cost suppliers within their boundaries at the expense of lower-cost suppliers
outside. Others are predominantly "trade-creating;" they generate new sources of
low-cost supply within the union by enlarging the market for each of the compo-
nent countries.1 One cannot say a priori which effect would predominate in North
American economic integration.
This paper assumes that advocates of North American economic union expect
it to create more effective competition. Under this theory, enlargement of the mar-
ket makes new alternatives available to consumers and to buyers of intermediate
products and raw materials. Economic integration opens new markets to existing
suppliers, and makes entry more inviting. It removes the protection of tariffs and
quotas from favored producers, and forces them to meet the standards of efficiency
that low-cost producers elsewhere in the union can achieve. It enables firms in
small countries to attain optimum economies of scale and integration when previ-
ous national markets were too small. It may convert monopoly into oligopoly,
oligopoly into imperfect competition, dominant firm collusion into open rivalry,
and so on.2
These effects on competition flow in the first instance from the changes in trade
policy that economic integration usually requires: abolition of tariffs, elimination
of import and export quotas, eradication of discrimination against other members
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of the union, and abandonment of subsidies. If the agreement went only as far as
customs union, trade policy would be the only source of improvement in competi-
tion.
In a closer form of integration, however, a common antitrust policy can supple-
ment trade policy in furthering effective competition. If total integration were con-
templated, full economic and political union under a single sovereignty, a single
and uniform antitrust policy would prevail. That is not, of course, a realistic ex-
pectation in the case of North America. In a common market or other limited
economic union, a common antitrust policy would have to be reconciled with the
remaining policies of the countries forming the union. Some problems may arise
in the formulation and application of a common policy on competition, and these
problems may demonstrate some obstacles to the initial formation of the union.
One must assume some structure among the many possible forms and degrees
of economic union among the countries of North America. Though some segments
of public opinion in both Canada and Mexico are vehemently opposed to North
American economic integration, 3 this paper will assume that a proposal is before
us to combine those two countries and the United States into a North American
Economic Community (NAEC) thai would include the following elements:
(1) It would constitute a free-trade area within itself, and would work toward the goal
of a common external tariff-a customs union.
(2) It would have a political arm that would enable the Community to enforce an
"antitrust" policy throughout the territory of its members, subject to exceptions and negoti-
ated preferences.
(3) It would permit the movement of persons across national frontiers in search of
employment, subject to certain restrictions imposed by the several member states.
(4) It would permit flow of investment across national frontiers, subject again to cer-
tain restrictions (such as those on foreign corporation affiliates) imposed by the several
member states. Some industries might by agreement be closed to foreign investment.
This paper will concentrate on the second element, a common antitrust or an-
timonopoly policy, rather than on details of trade policy, though the two are neces-
sarily related. The assumed restrictions on movement of persons and investment
are meant merely as realistic provisos. The relation of restrictions of foreign invest-
ment to a Community antitrust policy will be clarified below. The European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) does not have equivalent restrictions on factor
movements, but the EEC policy on monopoly and competition may help to indi-
cate the possibilities for a NAEC.
B. The European Economic Community as a "Model"
The Treaty of Rome, the constitution of the EEC, included explicit provisions
for antitrust policy and enforcement.
3. E.g., the "Remarks" by Dr. Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, to
the Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, October 17, 1980: "[I1t should not come as a surprise that we are
unreceptive to schemes for continental economic integration which some would superimpose on the estab-
lished pattern of bilateral links." (News-Canada, Press Release 61/80, p. 5) "Bilateral links" arc a rudi-
mentary form of economic union themselves, but they usually impinge on antitrust policy only by creating
exceptions. See also the joint Mexican-Canadian statement of May 27, 1980, rejecting trilateral North
American economic integration. NEw YORK TIMES, May 28, 1980, at D-5.
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Article 85 prohibits any agreement between or association of enterprises and
any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market. 4 The following practices are among
those singled out:
(a) Direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or other terms of sale.
(b) Limitation or control of markets, production, investment or technology.
(c) Sharing of markets or sources of supply.
(d) Price discrimination injurious to trading parties.
(e) Tying arrangements that actually restrict competition.
Agreements that improve production or distribution or technical progress with-
out eliminating competitors (zle., commodity agreements among Member States)
may be exempt. 5 All agreements must be registered with the EEC Commission.6
Article 86 prohibits "action by one or more enterprises to take improper advan-
tage of a dominant position within the Common Market," including, the above-
mentioned practices.7
The staff of the Commission of the EEC may bring complaints, as may any
Member State. The Commission may request offenders to cease offensive prac-
tices; if they do not, the matter can be referred to the Court of Justice which may
issue mandatory orders and impose fines for violations. It is understood that the
law of the EEC on restrictive trade practices will take precedence over the laws of
the individual Member States when a practice or agreement involves or affects the
economies of other Member States.8
The Commission has actually intervened in the affairs of certain Member
States to negotiate elimination of state-sponsored monopolies. It has opened the
market for cigarettes in France and salt and tobacco in Italy, formerly government
monopolies, to competitive suppliers elsewhere in the Community.9
On the other side of the balance, however, is the virtual exclusion of agricul-
ture from the competitive policy of the Community.
The EEC incorporates the preexisting European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), although the ECSC retains its own charter. The ECSC charter includes
similar provisions on monopoly policy, and an even stronger clause requiring the
consent of the Commission to mergers of firms in those industries. (It restrains the
creation of dominant positions as well as their abuse.) The charter also permits
control of prices and production in times of "manifest crisis" in steel or coal,",
which have come along rather frequently. Its cartel powers do not seem to work
very well, since frequent disputes arise over state subsidies, the allocation of pro-
duction quotas, etc. I I But in the opinion of most observers,' 2 the Coal and Steel
4. Excerpted and paraphrased from the text of the Treaty of Rome in A. CAMPBELL & D. TIIOMP-
SON, COMMON MARKET LAW: TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES 246-48(1962).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id
9. A. KERR, THE COMMON MARKET AND How IT WORKS 73 (1977) [hereinafter cited as KERRJ.
10. See, e.g., id. at 101-07.
11. Id
12. Id
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Community is substantially more competitive and more efficient than the national
cartels and state-sponsored monopolies that would doubtless exist in its place. The
ECSC, like the EEC's agricultural policy, affords an example of the compelling
need to grant exceptions to certain activities within a competitive policy for a com-
mon market.
The Commission reports active enforcement of competition policy. In 1977 it
made 17 decisions applying Articles 85 and 86, plus 20 more applying to the
ECSC, and settled 263 cases by negotiation. It proceeded against market-sharing
and price-fixing agreements. For example, it condemned and fined the members
of an international trade association of vegetable parchment manufacturers for
reservation of the British market, exchange of information on prices and quanti-
ties, and joint fixing of export prices. The Commission fined a Belgian automobile
firm and certain of its distributors for banning exports. It authorized several steel
industries' mergers under its specific ECSC merger control powers. It found that a
Dutch petroleum company had abused its dominant position by discriminating
against a customer in allocating supplies. And it secured the acquiescence of the
French Government to the termination of the governmental alcohol monopoly in
France. 13
C. The Focus of Policies to Promote Competition in a North American
Economic Community
If a North American Economic Community (NAEC) adopted a policy of en-
forcing rules of competition, that policy would presumably deal only with transna-
tional problems. Purely internal ones (if indeed there are any in the
interdependent world economy) would be left to the individual antitrust policies of
the three countries. On the international level, the policy would have three main
targets:
1. Cartels and other loose-kni? agreements among frms in two or more of the North Ameri-
can countries. Some of these agreements would also involve firms in other countries
outside the NAEC. If cartel agreements to fix prices, control production, or allo-
cate markets are to be prohibited, the three countries must have a common policy
regulating or prohibiting adherence by their firms to external cartels as well.
While the attitudes of the three countries on this matter are not uniform, each
government has favored industries and trades that it wants to protect or rational-
ize, often through compulsory cartellization 1 4 Each would retain the right to
enter into international commodity agreements for certain goods, and these cartel-
like arrangements would be virtually immune from common-market competitive
policy.
2. Unilateral monopolod efficts of trade. Such effects exist when a dominant firm
or monopolistic organization in one country has monopoly power over a particular
good in North America which is not effectively checked by competitive sources
outside the region, or when it is able to gain a large share of the market in an
13. EEC, ELEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN
1977 104 (1978).
14. See examples in text below.
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importing country through predatory or discriminatory practices that eliminate
local sources of supply and/or other imports. Rules of trade policy can deal with
some of these effects, but in a NAEC the antitrust authority might have to take on
most of the task of limiting a firm's exploitation of a dominant position in export-
ing goods to another NAEC country. Here again the Community might run
against the obstacle of government-controlled enterprise. Could it, for instance,
prevent the government-owned oil monopoly in Mexico from charging monopolis-
tic prices for oil in the United States? Or from discriminating in favor of Mexican
consumers?
3. Multinational corporations. The various fields of operation of multinational
corporations (MNCs) present different problems to a common market. Some
MNCs produce minerals and raw materials in some countries and export them to
others-in North America, chiefly from Canada and Mexico to the United States.
Most of these, but not all, are based in the United States and controlled by U.S.
investors. Other MNCs have trading subsidiaries in one country that distribute
goods, usually manufactured goods, exported from another-chiefly from the
United States to Mexico and Canada, and on a much smaller scale from Canada
to the United States and Mexico. Still others are manufacturing and service affili-
ates of MNCs whose home base is usually in the United States. Affiliates may
license technology or trademarks from the "parent" firm under restrictive condi-
tions that tend to limit development or use or restrain exports from the other coun-
try. In addition, of course, there are MNCs of all these types based in Europe or
Japan with affiliates in all three North American countries; these would have to
abide by any new rules of competition in a NAEC.
It was pointed out above that free (or mostly free) trade is itself a generator of
competition. Its effects may be more powerful than any antitrust policy which
might play only an auxiliary role in guaranteeing competition. The receptiveness
of the individual countries of North America both to freer trade and to a comm-
munity antimonopoly policy, and the provisos, forms, and exceptions that each
country would insist upon, would be strongly affected by the asymmetries among
the three economies. These are much greater than the differences among the Eu-
ropean economies of the EEC. Attitudes and policies toward monopoly and
cartellization within each country would also affect the outcome, as would each
country's perception of where monopoly problems are likely to originate. Weaker
economies of developing countries are likely to take a protectionist stance toward
domestic cartel arrangements. If the existing large firms within an economy are
controlled by foreign interests, that country may not be eager to remove restraints
on their expansion. It may not be receptive at all to the prospect of opening up
domestic industry and trade to unimpeded access by foreign MNCs which may
transform the economy to a more concentrated structure, at least in critical areas.
In North America, the question of foreign control is intermingled with that of
monopoly. A primary focus of an antimonopoly policy for the NAEC would be on
the multinational corporation. Indeed, effective supervision of the MNC seems to
be a leading problem for international economic policy, especially from the view-
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point of the developing countries.'
II
A VIEW OF MEXICO'S POSITION
A. Mexican Attitude Toward Market Competition
Mexican policy toward competition and market structure includes formal
statements in the law relating to both the domestic economic structure and foreign
ownership and control. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 guarantees freedom of
commerce and industry to both Mexicans and foreigners, subject to certain restric-
tions (permitted by Article 27) on acquisition of property by foreigners, and on
certain corporate activities. 16 Article 28, the key provision in the Constitution re-
lating to industrial structure, states, "There shall be no monopolies or es/ancos of
any kind; nor exemption from taxes; nor prohibitions under pretext of protection
to industry", except for a few designated activities such as mail and telegraph serv-
ice. 17 An eslanco is a state monopoly established to benefit the treasury-similar to
the Mercantilist monopolies exemplified by the Elizabethan sale of trade monopo-
lies. 18
This Adam Smithian view of the evils of governmentally sponsored monopolies
did not hold up in subsequent practice. The law of Monopolies enacted in 1931
and 193419 to put the constitutional provisions into effect exempted state-owned
enterprises and enterprises in which the state is a shareholder.
Since then, Mexican policy has not shown much concern for competitive struc-
ture and behavior. Most Mexican administrations have been concerned with
other economic goals-notably the goal of rapid development and retention of
Mexican control of the economic destiny of the country. The combination of these
aims has made the government decidedly paternalistic toward the economy.
While it has allowed considerable latitude to private ownership and the free mar-
ket, it has not demonstrated any consistent belief that competitive markets are the
most effective means for achieving its ends. Instances to the contrary abound.
In 1935, the government issued a presidential decree allowing the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce to authorize agreements and combinations among com-
petitors for various purposes.20
In 1936, the Mexican Congress gave the president the power to declare an
industry "saturated" and hence closed to further entry or expansion (the "law of
Industry Saturation"). 2'
Later legislation enlarged the power of the government to intervene in markets
15. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES, TD/122/Supp.1 (1972).
16. LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS Y SU LEY OR;ANICA, 1927.
17. Id
18. Letter to the author from Professor William P. Glade, Jr., Director of the Institute for Latin
American Studies at the University of Texas, September 5, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Glade].
19. Diario Oficial, Dec. 19, 1931 and Aug. 31, 1934 [hereinafter cited as D.O.].
20. Decreto of Nov. 23, 1935, published in D.O., Feb. I, 1936.
21. See Glade, supra note 18.
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through tax incentives and price control, and to prohibit foreign ownership of in-
dustry and other property.
22
A notable departure from the competitive market is Mexico's active policy of
using government enterprise to organize economic activity. The best known of
these enterprises, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) the Mexican government's oil
monopoly, was created in 1938 when the foreign-owned petroleum'industry was
nationalized by the Cardenas administration. The immediate cause of this action
was the refusal of the oil companies to comply with an order of the Mexican
Supreme Court following a protracted and complicated labor dispute. The action,
however, meshed well with the ongoing populist revolt against foreign control of
Mexico's resources and with the philosophy of the dominant political party. It was
not the result of a conscious choice of state monopoly as the best form of economic
organization. "Mexicanization has been the paramount objective even where na-
tionalization has been employed as a means to this end".
23
Subsequent administrations have nationalized the railroads, the electric power
industry, and other public utilities. The government has also largely created and
controlled the indigenous system of banking and financing. 24 A state-owned enter-
prise, FERTIMEX, currently produces about 90 percent of Mexico's fertilizer out-
put 25, and state-owned enterprise also produces basic petrochemicals. 26 The
number of state enterprises during the Echeverria administration (1970-1976) rose
to several hundred, many of which seemed to be losing money.
Under existing circumstances it is not possible to contemplate a competitive oil
industry in Mexico, even one owned by private Mexican interest. There is cer-
tainly no possibility for re-introduction of foreign-owned interests into the Mexi-
can oil industry. The oil monopoly and a few others would be impervious to any
North American antitrust policy, as would government monopolies in the other
two countries. But sole monopoly is not always the aim of public enterprise in
Mexico. For example, the government constructed a steel mill (Altos Hornos) in
the early 1940s, and later established a holding company, SIDERMEX, to control
it and several additional government steel properties. SIDERMEX, which pro-
duced about 62 percent of total Mexican steel output in 1980,27 did not preempt
the whole industry, but was designed to expand capacity, reduce imports, and
stimulate more expansionary and innovative behavior by the publicly and pri-
vately-owned companies (t"e., to break down a restrictive oligopoly).28 These
22. 1 am indebted to Professor Glade for the information in the foregoing paragraphs. Glade ob-
serves, "The anti-monopoly provisions of the constitution have whatever meaning the president finds it
convenient to give them at the time." Id
23. W. GLADE & C. ANDERSON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MEXICO 75 (1963).
24. The Nacional Financiera, one of the institutions created by the government, has mobilized domes-
tic capital and borrowed abroad to finance domestic industry at low rates of interest. It has tended to favor
public enterprise and selected large-scale private firms in "priority fields." Sheahan, Public Enterprise i?
Developing Couniris, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 210 (W.
Shepherd ed. 1976).
25. BANCO DE MEXICO, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY IN 1980 38 (1980).
26. Id
27. Getschow, Trouble at the Mill, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1981, at t, col. I.
28. Sheahan, supra note 24, at 212 (citing an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Norman Schneider).
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objectives are quite consistent with competitive markets, and antitrust policy could
only applaud them.
B. The Foreign Corporation in Mexico
Foreign ownership and control of Mexican economic activity has been a lead-
ing issue in Mexico since the time of Porfirio Diaz. Economic xenophobia was a
key ingredient in the Mexican Revolution of 1910. A large part of the concern
with foreign control, though not all, has been focused on the intrusion of business
interests from the United States. At first the problem was seen mainly as foreign
control of Mexico's natural resources. Since the nationalization of oil and the
strong assertion of governmental sovereignty over subsurface resources, it has ac-
quired other dimensions. Foreign ownership of land is still perceived as a threat,
and is still restricted in some areas. 29 The activities of multinational corporations
in the manufacturing industry and trade are an equally sensitive issue.
Multinational corporations have developed a considerable presence in Mexico.
The MNCs based in the United States, Europe, and Japan that have entered the
Mexican economy since World War II have sought: (i) to develop Mexican mar-
kets for their imported products through trading and marketing subsidiaries; and
(ii) to produce goods and services (such as services to tourists) in Mexico itself. At
first, as was true in most countries, MNCs began to manufacture in Mexico as a
way of bypassing barriers to imports and to participate in import substitution in
the domestic market. 30 Later, some local manufacturing affiliates of MNCs be-
came major exporters. In addition, some MNCs continued to export agricultural
products and raw materials-survivals from an earlier day. The MNCs, because
of their developed network of distribution channels and trade relations, were in a
good position to develop export markets for some types of manufactured goods.:
3 1
Foreign control coupled with monopoly power has elicited protective reactions,
but it should be noted that foreign control is the principal problem while monop-
oly is a secondary consideration. The alternatives to the MNC might well be local
monopoly or a sponsored domestic cartel guarded by protective tariffs.3
2
29. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution forbade ownership of land by foreign nationals in a one
hundred kilometer strip along the frontiers or a fifty kilometer strip along the seacoasts of the country.
However, the Foreign Investment Law of 1973 permitted foreigners to participate in limited land-holding
trusts in the previously forbidden zone. [1973] MEXICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECH-
NOLOGY LAWS Art. 18 (CCH).
30. Mexico has made extensive use of quantitative barriers. In 1976, 85 percent of all her imports
required a prior license. However, import license requirements have been eliminated for many products
since then. A. NOWICKI, MEXICO: MANUFACTURING SECTOR: SITUATION, PROSPECTS AND POLICIES
(1979), cited in Weintraub, Trade Integration ofthe UnitedStates, Canada, andMexico in THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: SELECTED ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY, 180 n.1 (Papers Prepared for
the Joint Economic Committee, 97th Congress, 1981).
31. R. VERNON, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES: THE OPERATION OF MULTINATIONAL UNITED
STATES ENTERPRISES tN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 15-17 (1972)(Study Prepared For the U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development). MNC subsidiaries in Mexico have not accounted for a disproportionate share
of Mexico's exports, nor in general have they exported a larger fraction of their output than locally owned
firms. See Jenkins, The Export Performance of Multinational Corporations in Mexican Industry, 15:3 J. DEv. STUD.
89 (1979).
32. Cf Rosenstein-Rodan, Problems of Private Foreign Investment and Multinational Corporations, in LATIN-
AMERICAN-U.S. ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS 256-58, 265-66 (R. Williamson, W. Glade, Jr. & K. Schmitt
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The kind of foreign control most disliked in Mexico is control from the United
States. The background of this attitude is well-known: it encompasses fears of
"imperialism" (old style) and "dependency" (new style). In 1975, the United
States absorbed 60 percent of Mexico's exports and supplied 62 percent of its im-
ports, with MNCs playing a significant role in both.33 Direct investment by the
TABLE I
SHARE OF FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN THE VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, MEXICO, 1970.
Group
Numbers Industry Groups Percent
Of Output of the
"Modern
(1975 Codes)' Of Total Output Segment"
20 Food Products .......... 8.6 26.5
21 Beverage industries ...... 19.0 26.3
22 Tobacco products ....... 79.7 84.0
23 Textiles ................ 6.8 7.9
24, 251 Footwear and clothing... 2.0 4.0
26, 27 Wood products and fur-
niture .................. 7.2 15.9
28 Paper and paper prod-
ucts .................... 27.4 32.9
29 Printing and publishing . 11.7 24.5
252 Leather and leather prod-
ucts .................... 1.7 4.6
32 Rubber and plastic prod-
ucts .................... 84.2 100.0
30 Chemical industry ...... 67.2 77.8
33 Nonmetallic mineral
products ............... 26.6 54.2
34 Basic metals ............ 25.2 27.6
35 Fabricated metal prod-
ucts .................... 37.0 67.6
36 Machinery (nonelectric) . 62.0 100.0
37 Machinery (electric) ..... 79.3 100.0
38 Transportation
equipment .............. 49.1 100.0
39 Miscellaneous
manufacturing .......... 29.6 60.5
TOTAL ................ 27.6 44.7
Source: Sepulveda A., Pohlica Industrialy Empresas Transnacionales en Mrxzco, in LAS EMIPRESAS
TRANSNACIONALES EN MEXICO 16 (B. Sepulveda A., 0. De Brody, & L. Meyer eds. 1974).
1. Group numbers from the industrial classification used in the Censo Industrial de Mexico
were attributed by the author of this article, based on the industry descriptions given in the
Sepulveda article. The petroleum products group (31) was not included in the Sepulveda tabu-
lations.
eds. 1974). His paper deals with the MNC in Latin America generally, not just in Mexico. Hec notes that
the MNC frequently helps to make local industry more efficient.
33. Ross, Mexican-US Relatwns." An Hislorical Perspective, in U.S. POLICIES TOWARD MEXICO: PE-
CEPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 5, 10 (R. Erb & S. Ross eds. 1979). By 1979 the U.S. share of Mexico's
exports had risen to 69 percent. BANCO DE MEXICO, supranote 25, at 69.
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United States in Mexico, amounting to $3 billion by 1975, accounted for 72 per-
cent of total direct foreign investment. 34 By contrast, Mexico supplied only 3.5
percent of U.S. imports in 1978, and absorbed only 4.6 percent of U.S. exports.3 5
Table 1 gives the most recent estimates available of the share of foreign-based
MNCs in the total value of industrial production in 1970 by major industrial
groups and their share of production in the "modern segment" of the Mexican
economy as of ten years ago.
Surprisingly, the proportion of foreign investment in total private investment in
Mexico has not been very large. It was estimated at 7.5 percent in the period
1962-70.36 Its real significance is its predominance in several of the most dynamic
and technologically advanced sectors of the economy, where the advantage of the
MNC is greatest.
C. Concentration
Do MNCs "import" monopoly into Mexican markets? Mexican perceptions of
that question would probably have a significant bearing on their acceptance or
rejection of an economic community which would give American and Canadian
enterprises free access to their economy. It is very hard to find evidence that the
structure of Mexican industry would be made more competitive by the removal of
trade barriers.
Measures of concentration are not very good indicators of the extent of monop-
oly in an economy like Mexico's since they take no account of imports, balkaniza-
tion of market territories, cartel agreements, or government controls. However,
according to a conventional measure of concentration, the share of the largest four
firms in the value of output of each industry, Mexican manufacturing industry is
nearly as concentrated as that of the United States. The weighted average of four-
firm concentration in shipments of manufacturing and mining industries in Mex-
ico in 1975 was 40 percent.3 7 For comparison, the weighted average four-firm ra-
tio for manufacturing industries in the United States in 1972 was 39 percent.3 8
The "highly" concentrated industries, those with four-firm ratios of over 80 per-
cent, accounted for about 7 percent of the total value of Mexican manufacturing
and mining output.3 9 They seem almost equally divided between those industry
34. Id
35. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. EXPORT AND IMPORT
TRADE 33, 38 (1979).
36. LAS EMPRESAS TRANSNACIONALES EN MExIco 38 (B. Sepulveda A., 0. De Brody & L. Meyer
eds. 1974).
37. Collected from SECRETARIA DE PROGRAMACION Y PRESUPUEsTA, DIRECCION GENERAL I)E Es-
TADISTICA, CENSO INDUSTRIAL, 1975 (1979) (by Centro de Investigaciones y Docencia Economicas, Mex-
ico D.F., and calculated by Gustavo Trevino, a graduate student at the University of Texas) [hereinafter
cited as CENSO INDUSTRIAL].
38. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1972 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES: CON-
CENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING (1975).
39. About 34 billion from a total of about 500 billion pesos in 1972. See CENSO INDUSTRIAL, Supra
note 37. The proportion for industries with four-firm concentration ratios of over 70 percent was 14 per-
cent. These proportions were roughly similar to those in the United States in 1972 for manufacturing
industries having similar degrees of concentration. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 38.
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groups dominated by foreign enterprise (such as flat glass, cigarettes, engines, vehi-
cles, photographic equipment, telephone apparatus) and concentrated industries
controlled by Mexican interests (such as some manufactured foodstuffs, furniture,
nonferrous metals, footwear, sheets and carpets).4" In addition, the petroleum
products industry is dominated by state-controlled enterprise, as are some other
nonmanufacturing activities.
4
'
In some technologically advanced manufacturing sectors, subsidiaries of
foreign firms may still have a large market share resulting from their introduction
of products or technology not previously produced or used in Mexico-products
that Mexico would otherwise have had to import from foreign sellers who might
have equally large market shares at home. Some industries, such as flat glass, seem
to be highly concentrated everywhere.
Indigenous Mexican-controlled firms are just beginning to attain size levels
comparable to the United States and Canadian giants. Of the 500 largest industri-
al firms in the world outside the United States in 1979, three were based in Mex-
ico. PEMEX was the 39th largest. 42  Grupo Industrial Alfa and Valores
Industriales, two privately owned conglomerates, were becoming MNCs them-
selves, the Alfa group already operating in the United States. 43 The leading export
by Mexico to the United States is crude oil produced by the state monopoly. Pe-
troleum exports would probably not be affected by creation of an economic com-
munity or common market. Quantities would depend entirely on What the
Mexican authorities decided to send northward. The price of crude oil on world
markets would be set by OPEC, which is beyond the reach of any antitrust policy.
PEMEX itself might establish affiliates in the United States and Canada to handle
downstream integration into refined products and petrochemicals. Few other op-
portunities are apparent for the intrusion of more Mexican MNCs into U.S. or
Canadian markets, even after formation of a NAEC, that would give them a posi-
tion remotely comparable to the position of foreign corporations in Mexico. How-
ever, such opportunities would grow over time.
D. Policy Toward Foreign Investment and Control
Mexican policy toward investment by foreigners, particularly multinational
corporations, was codified in several statutes passed in 1972-1973. The chief stat-
utes include the Law to Promote Mexican Investment 44 and the Law for the Re-
gistration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents
and Trade Marks.4 5 The provisions relevant to our question are discussed below. 46
Foreign investors are not allowed to acquire more than 25 percent of a Mexi-
can company's stock or 49 percent of its fixed assets without official permission.
40. CENSO INDUSTRIAL, supra note 37.
41. BANCO DE MEXICO, supra note 38.
42. The Foreign 500, FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 1980, at 188.
43. Id.
44. See Mexico Tightens Up on Foreign Investment, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 28, 1973, at 94-98; D.O. Dec. 30, 1972
and Dec. 28, 1973.
45. Id.
46. Id
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Foreign takeovers of Mexican companies are not permitted. The basic petroleum
and basic petrochemical industries, electric power, railroads, communication and
some mining are to be government monopolies; radio and television broadcasting,
coastwise sea and internal air transportation, and land development are reserved
for Mexican nationals.
Other future foreign investments are limited by the statutes to 49 percent non-
Mexican participation, although the Investment Commission would allow up to
100 percent foreign ownership in ventures in critical industries or depressed areas.
Foreign investments will be evaluated by such criteria as their contribution to ex-
ports, employment, and productivity. They cannot infringe on activities already
well handled by Mexican investors. Foreign-owned manufacturing firms must
agree to maximize the use of Mexican-produced components. The Commission
will favor "diversification" of foreign investment, i.e., non-U.S. sources. (Most of
these policies had been in effect for some time.)
No firm or affiliate in Mexico can make agreements with outside firms, includ-
ing parents, to restrict exports to any country of products made with technology
covered by the agreement. Nor will arrangements to import technology be ap-
proved if they restrict prices or production of goods in Mexico or obligate the
Mexican firm to buy materials or equipment from the supplier of the technology.
Some of the provisions of these laws are protectionist at the expense of open
competition, and thus would not assimilate easily into a continental antitrust pol-
icy. Entry of American and Canadian firms into protected industries would be
barred. Most U.S. or Canadian entry into any Mexican industry would have to be
via a Mexican-owned affiliate, primarily through a contractual relationship. But
the prohibitions on tied markets or restricted use of technology would be quite
consonant with a procompetitive policy for the continent.
A word should be added about the special arrangements in the Mexico-United
States border region. Presently, U.S. firms can set up plants on the Mexican side,
known as "maquiladoras", to utilize less expensive Mexican labor to assemble
products for reshipment to the United States. A large number of "in-bond" plants
have been created. The Mexican economy benefits from the additional employ-
ment in a depressed area. The present administration has made some efforts to set
up maquiladoras in other sections of Mexico. An economic community would
make such special arrangements unnecessary by extending free trade to the whole
of the two countries and Canada.
It is doubtful whether Mexico would accept the kind of antitrust policy that
would remove internal protection and open the economy to unlimited access by
other North American-based business. Acceptance of free access to activities other
than those reserved for government enterprise such as petroleum and utilities is
only a little less doubtful. Paradoxically, free trade might well lessen the intrusion
of U.S. and Canadian multinational corporations into actual in si/u ownership and
operation of business in Mexico itself, since many goods could then be supplied
from sites farther north without restriction. But the probable effect in Mexican
eyes would be very much the same: loss of infant-industry protection and aban-
donment of the policy of reserving as much of the Mexican market as possible for
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Mexican production, with a corresponding gain of foreign economic interests in
Mexico. Neither the reciprocal opportunities for Mexican exports to the Northern
countries, nor the improvement in the economic efficiency of internal markets,
would appear to offer compensating attractions. If the improvement were due to
entry by more foreigners, Mexicans would be apt to think of it as a monopolistic
rather than a competitive effect.
E. The Mexican Colossus
Oddly enough, what looks like Mexican economic weakness when measured
against the advanced industrial economies of the United States and Canada be-
comes intimidating strength when measured against some of the Latin American
economies. It should not be forgotten that Mexico is a rapidly developing econ-
omy, far ahead of those of Central America and the Northern Andes. Its recent
emergence as a major petroleum exporter provides further economic strength. In
the future, Mexican multinational corporations, as well as public enterprises may
play an important role in those countries. 47 (Similar statements could be made
about MNCs based in Brazil and Argentina.) Indeed, Mexico might see a more
promising role for itself in a Latin American common market than in a North
American one. Conversely, fear of the more advanced Latin American countries
may help explain why the Andean Group and the Central American Common
Market have apparently been more successful than the former Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA) which included the Big Three-Mexico, Brazil
and Argentina.48
III
A VIEW OF CANADA'S POSITION
Canada's advanced economic development and its high levels of income should
perhaps lead to attitudes toward proposals for economic integration different from
those of Mexico. Certainly there are differences in viewpoint and in policy be-
tween the two countries, but on some issues, mostly those involving the United
States, they are strikingly similar.
A. Canadian Antimonopoly Policy
Canadian federal policy is embodied largely in the Combines Investigation
Act. Briefly, the essential applications are as follows: 4 9
(1) Agreements and combinations that limit production, fix prices or enhance prices
unreasonably, prevent competition, or restrain trade are illegal. Criminal penalties are pro-
47. "Even more familiar are the preoccupations of Bolivian and Honduran officials who may wonder
whether it is a good idea to have so many Brazilians and Mexicans in their country and whether they are
trading a first-rate imperial power for a second-rate one." Diaz-Alejandro, Foreign Direcl Investment by Laihn
Americans, in MULTINATIONALS FROM SMALL COUNTRIES 179 CF. Agmon & C. Kindleberger eds. 1977).
48. See R. VERNON & L. WELLS, ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 217-23
(2d ed. 1976). The Central American Common Market has itself suffered from internal dissension due to
the uneven development of its members. See ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA 34-42 (W.
Cline & E. Delgado eds. 1978).
49. CAN. REV. STAT. C. C-23 (1970).
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vided. Exchange of statistics and agreement on product standards, among other things, are
not prohibited.
(2) Formation of monopolies, and mergers which are likely to lessen competition, are
illegal.
(3) Price discrimination and predatory practices are illegal if they substantially lessen
competititon or eliminate competitors. Resale price maintenance is prohibited.
(4) Restrictive Trade Practices Commission investigates possible violations, holds
hearings, issues cease-and-desist orders, and reports cases to the Attorney General for en-
forcement in the courts.
The parallels between these laws and procedures and those of United States
antitrust policy are obvious. Canadian policy seems to make greater use of crimi-
nal penalties and less of civil remedies 0 than does that of the United States, but
there would be little difficulty in reconciling the formal statutes and processes of
the two countries under a North American Economic Community. The difficulties
would tend to arise in the choice of targets. The 1975 amendments to the Com-
bines Investigation Act specifically took aim at acts of multinational corporations.
They prohibited or required modification in Canada of policies dictated by parties
outside Canada-whether home offices, parent companies, or governments in their
home countries -that would adversely affect competition in Canada or its foreign
trade.5 1 As in Mexico, concern with foreign control is a leading issue in Canada.
B. Foreign Investment and Control in Canada
Foreign corporations have invested in Canada, either by establishing affiliates
or by acquiring them, for the usual reasons: (i) to facilitate distribution of goods
they manufacture elsewhere and import into Canada; (ii) to cross import barriers
by manufacturing in Canada and marketing there; (iii) to secure an assured supply
of raw materials by acquiring extractive properties in Canada; and (iv) to take
advantage of lower factor costs in some industries by producing in Canada for
export to other markets. Canada has offered very favorable opportunities for for-
eign investment of both portfolio and direct types, though problems for policy
arise mainly from direct investment. Foreign investment has always been sizable.
Before World War I, it was predominantly British; since then, predominantly
American. In 1977, U.S. investment in Canada had a book value of over $65
billion, and represented over 75 percent of all foreign investment in Canada.
About 58 percent of U.S. investment was direct.52
The consequence of direct investment has been foreign control of a substantial
part of the Canadian economy. Table 2 gives the percentage of foreign control of
investment in various types of activity. U.S. control is particularly concentrated in
manufacturing, (43 percent of the total value of assets in 1977); in oil and gas
production (58 percent); and in mining (45 percent). -"
The influx of foreign investment was generally welcomed in Canada until the
50. One special remedy for monopoly is admission of the product to Canada free of import duty.
CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23, 28 (1970).
51. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES
OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 35-36 (1977) (Refers to sections 31.5 and 31.6 of the Act).
52. Gherson, US Investment in Canada, 3 FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. 2, 11 (Spring, 1980).
53. Id. at 12, 13.
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1960s, when the government and the public began to develop serious reservations
about U.S. control. Governmental questions about foreign ownership culminated
in the so-called Gray Report in 1971. The consequence of the Report and the
deep public misgivings that precipitated it was the Foreign Investment Review Act
of 1973. 5 4 This Act set up an Agency (FIRA) to review and disallow foreign take-
overs of Canadian businesses and, by amendment in 1975, establishment of new
businesses by non-Canadian interests. The criterion for approval was that the pro-
posal must show "significant benefit" to Canada-in new employment, enhanced
TABLE 2
FOREIGN CONTROL IN CANADIAN NONFINANCIAL
Percent of Foreign
Group Control of Assets
1970 1977
M iningt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69 51
Manufacturing 2 . . . . . . . . . . .  58 54
Primary metals ....... 43 14
Wood products ....... 33 21
Chemicals ............ 80 68
Machinery ........... 75 64
Leather products ..... 30 20
Transportation
equipment ........... 85 77
Metal fabricating ..... 47 40
Furniture ............ 21 16
Petroleum and coal
products ............. 96 92
Printing, publishing... 15 11
Paper ................ 43 39
Knitting mills ........ 21 18
Miscellaneous ........ 51 48
Beverages ............ 32 31
Clothing ............. 14 14
Rubber products ...... 93 94
Food products ........ 36 39
Electrical products .... 65 69
Textiles .............. 52 58
Nonmetallic mineral .. 63 70
Tobacco products ..... 86 100
Agriculture, Forestry, Fish-
ing ...................... 13 8
Services .................. 22 18
Construction .............. 16 12
Trade .................... 25 22
U tilities .................. 8 7
Total nonfinancial ........ 36 30
INDUSTRIES, 1970 AND 1977
Asset Value,
1977
(Can. S Millions)
35,886
95,414
8,670
4,126
7,722
3,742
448
8,324
5,652
903
13,442
2,480
12,016
374
2,642
2,420
1,308
1,438
7,336
4,875
2,476
3,998
1,022
4,063
21,250
16,305
49,360
81,662
303,940
54. Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973, c. 46.
1. Including nonintegrated oil and gas producers.
2. Manufacturing groups are arranged in decreasing order of gain in Canadian control,
1970-77, as in the source tables.
Source: Gherson US Investment in Canada, 3 FOREIGN INVESTMEN.r REv. 2 (Spring, 1980).
ANTI[MONOPOLY POLIC3Y
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
productivity, improved technology, etc. The effect on competition was to be eval-
uated as well.5 5 During the first five years the Government decided over 1650
FIRA cases; 130 proposals were disallowed. Over 90 percent were approved. Rea-
sons for disapproval of takeovers included restriction on Canadian exports or on
importation of technology to the detriment of home development. 56
The similarities of the Canadian and Mexican policies are evident, as is the
extent of their trade interdependencies with the United States. In the mid-1970s,
about 69 percent of Canada's imports came from the United States; about the
same proportion of her exports went to the United States. 57
These trade relationships, as well as the activities of multinational corpora-
tions, are bound to influence the formation and operation of any North American
Economic Community in many ways other than their impact on competition and
policy toward monopoly. However, it is instructive to look at Canadian industrial
concentration and its relation to foreign control before speculating on the effects of
removing barriers to U.S. imports and investment in Canada.
C. Concentration and the Multinational Firm
The Canadian economy exhibits high-to-moderate concentration, somewhat
higher than that in the United States. In 1972, about twice as many industries had
four-firm concentration levels exceeding 60 percent in Canada as in the United
States.58 The nine largest manufacturing industries in Canada were all more con-
centrated than their counterparts south of the border. 59 Overall, the 50 largest
non-financial Canadian corporations in 1973 accounted for 32.4 percent of total
assets and 15.0 percent of total sales. 6°
In the manufacturing sector, the 50 largest Canadian firms had 31.7 percent of
total sales in 1973 and the 100 largest had 39.1 percent. 6 1 For comparison, in the
United States in 1972 the 50 largest manufacturing corporations accounted for
24.5 percent of total value added by manufacture and the 100 largest for 33.1
percent. 62
It is not easy to determine whether U.S.-controlled multinational corporations
have contributed to a problem of structural monopoly in Canadian markets, but
55. Id
56. The Foreign Investment Review Act, Address by the Hon. Jack Horner, Minister of Industry,
Trade and Commerce to the Toronto Society of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada, (Feb. 7,
1979).
57. CANADA YEAR BOOK 871 (spec. ed. 1976). In 1978, about 20 percent of U.S. exports went to
Canada, and about the same proportion of U.S. imports came from Canada. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1980).
58. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 39-41 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION]; see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 38.
59. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 58.
60. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONCENTRATION AND
COMPETITION POLICY 78 (1979).
61. Id
62. Id at 84.
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TABLE 3
U.S. CONTROL OF LARGEST CANADIAN COMPANIES, 1979
Size Group U.S. Share of Ownership
(Ranked by 1978-79 Sales) 100% Over 50%
-- Number-
Industrials
1 - 50 .................. ........... ......... 6 12
5 1 - 100 ..................................... 15 23
10 1 - 150 ..................................... 20 23
15 1 - 200 ..................................... 22 2 7
Total, 200 largest .............................. 63 85
Merchandisers
25 largest ................................... 8 9
Petroleum Producers
(unintegrated)
20 largest ................................... 3 9
Mining producers
(unintegrated)
20 largest ................................... 0 2
Source: Gherson, US Investment in Canada, 3 FOREIGN INVESTMENr REV. 2, 14 (Spring, 1980).
they are certainly represented among the largest firms doing business in Canada,
as shown in Table 3. The Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration found a
"... strong direct correlation between the degree of foreign ownership and the
degree of concentration and the presence of large firms. The degree of foreign
ownership is very high in those industry segments where an oligopoly of three or
four firms account for a high proportion of total sales in the industry. '63 But it
concluded that foreign direct investment ". . . does not seem to have increased the
concentration of industries in Canada. '6 4 Canadian industries with a high per-
centage of foreign ownership were no more concentrated than similar industries
with lower foreign ownership in other countries. And some of the most concen-
trated industries in Canada (e.g. , cotton cloth manufacture) had relatively low for-
eign shares. 65
Thirty of the largest industrial firms in Canada (which are among the 500
largest in the world outside the United States) are listed in Table 4, along with the
apparent location of their control. The largest U.S.-controlled firms in Canada, as
in the United States, are in motors, oil, chemicals, and electrical equipment; pre-
sumably those firms would be large and their sectors concentrated even if they
were under Canadian control. Several, in fact, have made the transition to Cana-
dian control as indicated in Table 4.
It is noteworthy that a sizable proportion of the large Canadian-controlled
firms in Table 4 are multinationals that have susidiaries in the United States. Ex-
amples are Noranda Mines, MacMillan Bloedel (paper and wood products),
63. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 192. For an earlier study, see Rosenbluth, The Relation
between Foreign Control and Concentration in Canadian Industry, 3 CANADIAN J. ECON. 14, 17 (1970).
64. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 194.
65. Id at 38.
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TABLE 4
THE LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS IN CANADA, 1979
(RANKED BY SALES)
Name ControlI Sales ($000) Assets
I. General Motors of Canada ........ A 8,032,990 1,902,705
2. Canadian Pacific ................. C 6,957,492 9,416,618
3. Ford Motor Co. of Canada ........ A 6,103,129 2,001,195
4. Imperial Oil ..................... A 5,484,040 3,984,075
5. Alcan Aluminum ................. C 2  4,381,222 4,490,213
6. Massey-Ferguson ................. C 2,972,966 2,745,444
7. Gulf Canada ..................... A 2,567,016 2,814,101
8. Inco ............................. C 2  2,488,543 4,335,389
9. Texaco Canada .................. A 2,252,540 1,968,273
10. Chrysler Canada ................. A 2,180,224 N.A.
11. Noranda M ines .................. C 2,121,130 2,841,668
12. Canada Packers .................. C 2,011,810 389,233
13. MacMillan Bloedel ............... C 1,861,294 1,448,100
14. Steel Co. of Canada .............. C 1,785,227 2,066,923
15. Canada Development Corp ........ C3  1,720,090 2,369,001
16. Northern Telecom ................ C 1,622,438 1,612,903
17. Seagram ......................... C 1,607,728 2,437,076
18. M oore ........................... C 1,541,048 968,099
19. International Thomson C 1,484,565 1,252,565
20. Domtar ......................... C 1,276,567 836,213
21. Abitibi-Price ..................... C 1,255,686 1,013,092
22. Dominion Foundries & Steel ...... C 1,225,080 1,429,085
23. Canadian General Electric ........ A 1,142,847 773,833
24. Consolidated-Bathurst ............ C 1,062,244 848,898
25. Husky Oil ....................... C 898,907 957,306
26. M olson .......................... C 885,059 542,908
27. John Labatt ..................... C 819,925 534,306
28. Dome Petroleum ................. C2 807,125 2,679,295
29. H. Walker-Gooderham & Worts ... C 768,553 1,168,941
30. DuPont Canada .................. A 750,573 491,014
1. A = U.S. controlled; C = Canadian controlled, as determined from annual reports.
There is noncontrolling American portfolio investment in many of the Canadian-controlled
firms.
2. Formerly, A.
3. Government-controlled.
Source: The Foreign 500, FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 1980, at 188, 190-99.
Note: Shell Canada is not shown since Fortune consolidates it with Royal Dutch Shell, a
British/Dutch corporation; it would probably be among the largest firms in this table.
Husky Oil, and Hiram Walker (No. 29), which, in addition to operating its dis-
tilled-spirits business, was seeking to acquire a U.S.-based oil company for over $1
billion in late 1980.1i" Northern Telecom, a subsidiary of the Canadian Bell Tele-
phone Company, has aggressively entered the U.S. market for data processing and
data communications equipment (in which the leading U.S. telephone company
until recently could operate only on a restricted basis) and has acquired U.S. man-
ufacturing affiliates such as Data 100 and Sycor. Alcan Aluminum, formerly a
66. Zehr, Ht'ram Walter Seeks US. -Based Oil Firm and is Willing to Spend Over S/ Blon, Wall. St. J., Oct.
15, 1980, at 18. Zehr also notes that Hiram Walker's planned acquisition of Highland Distilleries Co.,
Glasgow, Scotland, was rejected earlier in 1980 by Britain's Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
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subsidiary of Alcoa, has acquired or built several aluminum fabricating plants in
the United States. International Thomson has acquired newspapers in Ohio. Jo-
seph E. Seagram has long been one of the largest distillers and marketers of spirits
and wine in the United States. In 1974, Canadian interests owned 457 manufac-
turing plants in America, out of a total of 2,053 foreign-owned plants listed by the
Department of Commerce.17 So far there has been no public outcry against Cana-
dian ownership.
The value of Canadian direct investment in the United States had reached
almost Can. $5 billion in 1974, only a fraction of the Can. $29 billion American
direct investment in Canada, but somewhat larger than the American direct in-
vestment in Mexico. 6 8
One can only speculate on what would remain of the Foreign Investment Re-
view Act and similar policies in a North American Economic Community. Could
acquisition of Canadian business by American firms then be left entirely to anti-
trust restrictions in Canada? The Canadian government might well enforce a pol-
icy within NAEC requiring majority Canadian ownership or control of affiliates of
American firms. Some acquisitions or extensions could be checked by the Com-
munity's antitrust policy, but probably not enough to satisfy Canada's wish to
minimize foreign ownership.
In fact, some acquisitions in Canada by American corporations in the past
have been vetoed by American antitrust policy. For example, in 1966 a U.S. Court
forbade acquisition by the Schlitz Brewing Co. of John Labatt, Ltd., a Canadian
brewery. Another court prevented Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey from acquiring
the Potash Co. of America, a producer of potash in both countries, because the
latter competed in Canada with Imperial Oil Ltd., a Standard Oil affiliate and a
potential supplier of potash to the U.S. market. However, the Canadian govern-
ment has occasionally objected to American antitrust orders that affect Canadian
firms, as when a U.S. court ordered Alcoa to divest itself of its control of Alumi-
num Company of Canada in 1950. A similar conflict arose in 1951 when DuPont
was forced to divest itself of ownership of Canadian Industries, which it had owned
jointly with Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd."9
D. Canadian Protectionism and Special Relationships
The policy embodied in the Foreign Investment Review Act is only one of
several aspects of Canadian protectionism and related policies that might compel
67. E. FRY, FINANCIAL INVASION OF THE U.S.A. 60 (1980). Fry also notes that a considerable share of
real-estate development in the United States, especially in Florida, is now being conducted by Canadian
investors. "Cadillac Fairview Corporation, Canada's biggest real estate developer, is bulding ollice towers
in San Francisco and Denver, three California industrial parks, three Florida housing projects, and several
shopping centers scattered across the United States." Id at 112. These, however, do not seem to present
any question of concentration or monopoly.
68. Globerman, US Ownership of Firms in Canada, CANADA-U.S. PROSPECTS 7 (1979). It should be
added that some Canadian exterior investment is by Canadian firms controlled in the United States-but
probably not much in the United States itself.
69. Leyton-Brown, The Mulinational Enterprise and Conjlt in Canadian-Ameri.can Relations, 28:4 INT'I. OR-
(;ANIZATION 739 (1974).
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special exceptions to a free-trade, free-investment Community agreement. Cana-
dian tariffs on manufactured imports are comparatively high, and they are but-
tressed by quotas and other restrictions.7 0 "The tariff combined with foreign
ownership-which is itself a product of earlier tariff policy-has produced or
maintained a basically inefficient industrial structure with truncated branch
plants producing too large a range of goods . . . for too small a market."'" A free
trade agreement would force such industries to compete more effectively in order
to survive, but those effects would result from trade policy rather than antitrust
policy. Without trying to speculate on what special exemptions from free trade
would be worked into an integration agreement, we can identify some sectors that
might well, in the Canadian view, call for special protection from a NAEC anti-
trust policy.
The famous Auto Pact of 1965 was itself a movement toward freer trade, but
with protectionist safeguards. The Canadian government virtually abolished tar-
iffs on automobiles imported from the United States in exchange for commitments
from U.S. auto manufacturers that they would increase the volume of output in
their Canadian affiliates and purchases from independent Canadian suppliers, by
more than the growth rate in the Canadian market. Though the arrangement
involves a form of market allocation and production quotas, its replacement by
unrestricted free trade would not be welcomed by the Canadian authorities of
their constituent economic interests.
Another sector that is not likely to return to a regimen of unrestricted private
market competition is energy. 72 The Canadian government has taken control of
oil and gas exports and imports. It has virtually phased out export of crude oil to
the United States (in the early 1970s oil was one of the leading Canadian ex-
ports 73) and has sharply restricted any further commitments to export natural gas,
while establishing a two-price system for exports and internal consumption. In
1975 it set up a government controlled corporation, Petro-Canada, which is not to
be a sole monopoly after the example of PEMEX but is expected to become the
largest company in the Canadian petroleum industry. Petro-Canadian has ac-
quired a number of properties that were formerly U.S.-controlled (Atlantic Rich-
field Canada, Pacific Petroleum).
The oil industry in Canada has recently come under fire from Canadian anti-
trust authorities for its "monopolistic practices" including alleged overcharges on
70. In the near future, as a result of the Tokyo Round of GATT, some 65 percent of Canadian
imports from the United States will be free of duty. (And 80 percent of U.S. imports from Canada will be
duty-free, up from 60 percent in 1978.) Cohen, Constants and Vanables in Canada-US Relatons, INT'L PER-
SPECTIVES 4 (Nov./Dec, 1980). But Canadian duties are not only higher on the average than U.S. tariffs;
they are concentrated in manufacturing having high value added.
71. STANDING SENATE COMM. ON FOR. AFFAIRS, CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, CANADA'S
TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, VOL. II, 116 (1978) cited in WEINTRAUB, supra note 30, at
187 n.12.
72. See McKie, UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN ENERGY POLICY in OIL IN TIlE SEVENTIES: ESSAYS
ON ENERGY POLICY 245 (C. Watkins & M. Walker eds. 1977).
73. CANADIAN YEAR BOOK 715 (1974).
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transfer prices for imported crude and excessively high refining margins. 74 The
targets are four multinational companies-Imperial (Exxon), Gulf, Texaco, and
Shell Canada, the first three controlled in the United States. These four compa-
nies controlled 64 percent of Canadian refining capacity in 1979 and 56 percent of
the country's retail outlets in 1980-a substantially greater concentration than in
the United States.7 - Opening up the Canadian oil market to North American free
trade would decrease concentration but probably would increase foreign penetra-
tion. 76
In October, 1980, the Federal Government announced plans to increase Cana-
dian government and private ownership and control of oil and gas properties to 50
percent (up from 30 percent at the time). Petro-Canada was to have preemptive
rights to 25 percent of all oil and gas discovered on Federal lands in the future, and
the government itself would finance the purchase of interests in multinational oil
companies with Canadian holdings so as to raise Canadian participation in their
affiliates to at least 50 percent. Direct takeover by Petro-Canada of several mul-
tinational affiliates in Canada was anticipated. 77 The plans would also require
maximum use of Canadian goods and services by the oil industry-a rule that
would probably conflict with GATT as well as with any general NAEC antitrust
policy. The U.S. government has strong objections to these new plans.78
Earlier that same year Canada and Mexico concluded a government-to-gov-
ernment agreement to sell 50,000 barrels per day of Mexican oil to Canada in
exchange for a Canadian commitment to aid Mexican economic development
with joint investments, assistance in transfer of technology, and $430 million in
credits for export of capital equipment to Mexico. 79
As in Mexico, a North American Community antitrust policy would necessar-
ily exempt petroleum-and probably other Canadian energy industries as well,
deferring to government preemption of policy.
Still another exemption would probably be granted to commodity agreements
or government-sponsored cartels. Canada has a major interest in the export of raw
materials and agricultural commodities. It has been a party to the several Interna-
tional Wheat Agreements, as has the United States. Although Canada refused to
participate in producer associations in iron ore, copper, mercury, silver and tung-
sten during the 1970s it apparently did participate in the uranium cartel before
1975, and allegedly even pemitted Canadian uranium producers to infringe the
Combines Investigation Act.80 Canadian sources claim that these actions were
74. Urquhart, Mabr Changes in Canadian Oil Indust
, 
Sought After 7 Year Antitrust Inqufry, Wall. St. J.,
Nov. 5, 1981, at 18, col. 1.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. Id
78. Urquhart, Canada Drive, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
79. Giniger Mexico to Sell Oil to Canada, NEW YORK TIMES, May 28, 1980, at D-5, col. 1.
80. Stewart, Canada andthe Uranium Cartel, INT'L PERSPECTIVES, 21, 22 (July/August 1980). However,
the Canadian government subsequently decided to prosecute for antitrust violations the very companies
that it had encouraged to participate in the cartel, including two state-owned companies. Urquhart, Com-
modities, Wall St. J., June 24, 1981, at 34, col. 1, confirmed in Six Canada Producers of Uranium Charged in
Antirust Case, Wall St. J., July 8, 1981, at 18, col. I.
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taken in response to American protectionist policies. The Canadian government
has declined to make information available to contending parties in a U.S. anti-
trust suit involving the uranium cartel.8 '
The East Coast Fisheries Agreement between Canada and the United States,
currently in limbo, is an example of the kind of bilateral trade and commodity
agreement that recognizes a special status for certain activities and implicitly
would shelter it from the full impact of a NAEC antitrust policy. 8 2
IV
MESHING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY
Integrating antitrust policy into a North American Economic Community of
the kind contemplated would probably be less difficult in the United States than
elsewhere on the continent. Apart from the inevitable protected activities, eco-
nomic policy in the United States would not conflict in decisive ways with a
NAEC antitrust policy, nor with free trade and free investment from other mem-
bers of the community. If anything, antitrust policy on the EEC model would be
less restrictive than that already in effect within the United States. Many of the
U.S. rules are much the same as those of the EEC (e.g., price fixing, market alloca-
tion, quotas, price discrimination, and mergers that would enhance the power of
dominant firms).
In a broad sense, free trade would increase the competitiveness of markets in
the United States, since cheaper sources in Canada and Mexico could reduce
prices in any market previously protected by tariffs. But most products in which
Mexico or Canada now have a comparative advantage are sold in markets that
already have a competitive structure, and a large proportion of those products
come in free or nearly free of duty at present. Many of the really concentrated
industries in the United States, which produce such products as automobiles (al-
ready subject to special agreement with Canada), light bulbs, plate glass, ready-to-
eat breakfast cereals, home washing machines, steel boilers, cathode ray tubes,
roller bearings and space satellite communication systems83 would probably not
initially feel much more competition from sources in Canada and Mexico, where
such products are more than likely to be produced by a branch plant of an Ameri-
can firm. The Canadian-controlled large firms in Table 4 are mostly in the extrac-
tive industries, in non-export activity or in less concentrated manufacturing
industries. But there are exceptions, and as time goes on some concentrated Amer-
ican markets may benefit from additional competition, e.g., from Canadian alumi-
num products and machine tools or Mexican beer and vinyl tile.
The policy of repatriating ownership and control of industry from multina-
81. See Stewart, supra note 80.
82. The Fisheries Agreement had major national political and economic significance for Canada, but
its ratification was blocked by a few U.S. Senators because of objections by strictly local economic inter-
ests, leading Canadians again to complain about the differences in "perspective." Such episodes add
weight to Canadian objections to North American economic integration.
83. These products classes all had concentration ratios (the percentage of total shipments accounted
for by the largest four manufacturers) over 80 percent in 1972. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note
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tional corporations in those two countries should also create new competition in
the American market from those former affiliates that can survive and grow from
branch-plant status to fully developed firms on a par with their former parents. At
present we do not know how many potential rivals exist in Mexico and Canada.
Some affiliates of MNCs could not survive open competition but would in time be
replaced by exports from U.S. plants. These, of course, might seek protection of
some sort.
To date there has been no major American initiative to restrict investment by
multinational corporations, especially those controlled in Canada and Mexico.8 4
The MNC is not perceived as a carrier of monopoly power transmitted from
outside the country. U.S. policy at present would find it unnecessary to impose
any general requirement of domestic ownership or control of Canadian or Mexi-
can firms operating within its borders.
Export-import trade among the three countries would encounter some new
competitive conditions under NAEC antitrust policy. Except where specifically
exempted from the rules against price-fixing, groups of exporters within the NAEC
could no longer agree to limit exports or adhere to common prices. The new anti-
monopoly policy would override some difficult problems of jurisdiction for Ameri-
can antitrust enforcement against Canadian and Mexican firms, since the NAEC
would not be limited to the reach of a single sovereignty.8 5 At the same time it
would probably kill off any Webb-Pomerene export associations operating prima-
rily in North America.
The United States would undoubtedly reserve certain sectors of economic ac-
tivity for special treatment, as it has from its own antitrust laws. Regulated mo-
nopolies, communications and transportation would probably require
modification of a competitive policy. Like almost all countries, the United States
would continue governmentally-sponsored cartel practices in agriculture (price
fixing, marketing agreements, quotas, production controls, subsidies, etc.) subject
to general trade rules negotiated for the NAEC as a whole.
Certain subsidized or sensitive energy industries, notably nuclear power, might
be protected against competition within the Community. Finally, the U.S. Gov-
ernment has long allowed special exemptions from antitrust rules for defense in-
dustries, which would doubtless continue-a significant exception because of the
magnitude of defense material production in the United States.
84. Sporadic attempts to limit or forbid acquisition of land and other property by Arab interests have
occurred, but these are directed neither at MNCs as such nor at monopoly power. Some uneasiness has
resulted from growing Japanese direct investment. In 1974 Congress passed the Foreign Investment Study
Act directing the Commerce and Treasury Departments to investigate the problem, but the resulting re-
ports in 1976 found no significant threat in foreign investment. See Fry, supra note 69, at 5-6.
85. There are cases on record of U.S. prosecution of American firms that attain monopoly elsewhere.
In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), defendant had secured a monopoly of sisal in
Mexico, with only indirect effects on the domestic market via imports. And in United States v. Aluminum Co.
ofAmerica, 148 F.2d 416 (1945), a Canadian affiliate (Alcan) was held to have violated the Sherman Act
because of its agreement with European aluminum producers not to export to the United States market.
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V
THE IMPACT OF NORTH AMERICAN ANTIMONOPOLY
POLICY
A. Improvements in Competition
What improvements in competition could be expected from a NAEC antitrust
policy? Most of the improvements in competitive performance (or in economic
efficiency of resource allocation as conventionally defined) would result from freer
trade. But there might be a visible incremental impact from a NAEC antimono-
poly policy on several kinds of practices and even on market structure.
Rules like those of the EEC would certainly restrict the formation of cartels
and agreements affecting the North American market, unlessthe agreements were
sponsored by the governments of the constituent states. However, it is not evident
that any private cartels now exist that would be eliminated by such a policy.
Agreements such as the Auto Pact are agreements among governments, and hence
would be exempt. If new commodity agreements in the ten "core commodities"
suggested by UNCTAD in 197586 were organized, several commodity agreements
such as one of coffee, would include exports from Mexico, and others on the poten-
tial list might involve both the United States and Canada. These would be im-
mune. But any such program that excluded or injured producers or consumers in
another North American country would undoubtedly have to be reconstructed to
protect the interest of all NAEC members. It is possible that stronger export as-
sociations for a limited group of products produced in two or more of the North
American states could be formed to compete in other markets more effectively-
petrochemicals is an obviously eligible case-but that has little to do with competi-
tion within the NAEC.
If the Community has policies and rules to restrict structural monopoly, they
could be as mild as the EEC rules or as strict as a combination of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act-antimonopoly and antimerger
rules on an international scale. We cannot predict how the NAEC might ap-
proach international structural monopoly, but we can guess that Canada and
Mexico, especially the latter, would insist on some sort of restraints on monopoly
power that they perceive as emanating from the United States. Presumably each
country would continue its restraints on the behavior and policies of the foreign
multinationals, specifically:
(1) Restraints on the international allocation of markets among affiliates of a MNC,
and/or such practices as prohibition of exports;
(2) Restraints on pricing "abuses" by MNCs, such as price discrimination among
countries, grossly artificial transfer prices for imports and exports among affiliates, etc.;
(3) Prohibition of restrictive clauses in patent licenses; and
(4) Control of acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign MNCs. 8 7
86. The UNCTAD "Core" list included cocoa, coffee, cotton, copper, hard fibers, jute, rubber, sugar,
tea, and tin. McNicol, Political Economy of an Integrated Commodity Program, in STABILIZING WORLD COM-
MODITY MARKETS 196 (F. Adams & S. Klein eds. 1978), citing Resolution 93 (IV) of the Fourth U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development.
87. Cf the litany of practices in OECD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, supra note 51, at 27. This report observes: "[M]ultinational enterprises typically operate on
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If these Mexican and Canadian policies continued to preempt these issues from
NAEC antitrust policy, the latter would have two remaining roles relating to sin-
gle-firm monopoly: (i) to protect the U.S. market from similar effects emanating
from Canadian and Mexican MNCs-hardly a major problem as yet, but perhaps
a future threat; and (ii) to restrain the unilateral exercise of power by private mo-
nopolies in each country of the NAEC that export to or import from another (1e.,
at arm's length, not through affiliates).
If Canada and Mexico believe that trade monopoly and monopsony based in
the United States and not operating through MNCs are threats to their economic
welfare, they might welcome that arena as one for NAEC antitrust enforcement.
It would probably be extraordinarily difficult for a NAEC antitrust authority to
enforce any policy of structural reorganization of firms located wholly within the
United States (or Canada or Mexico) if those firms had escaped antitrust dissolu-
tion at the hands of their national governments; but the NAEC could control in-
ternational price discrimination and predatory practices in North American trade.
B. Asymmetry as the Stumbling Block
Antimonopoly policy illustrates again the problem that runs through all as-
pects of any North American economic union-the considerable discrepancies in
size, power, and (in the case of Mexico) stage of development among the three
North American countries. The words of Harry G. Johnson fifteen years ago are
pertinent:
[A] country will be motivated to join the union only if it judges that its industrial competi-
tiveness or comparative advantage in industrial production is strong enough for its indus-
trial production to increase within the union .... Consequently, customs unions are most
likely to be negotiable among countries with a similar degree of preference for industrial
production, and with a similar degree of comparative advantage in industrial production,
or, as it is sometimes put, countries at a similar stage of economic development.
8 8
If all three countries had similar market structures, and if the transmission of
competitive and anticompetitive influences across their mutual borders were ran-
dom and roughly symmetrical, then an enlarged antitrust policy would be a posi-
tive incentive for the formation of a North American Economic Community. If all
three countries perceived the threats of monopoly from outside North America as
greater than the threats originating wihin, then again we could expect them to
draw together on a competition policy. But under the circumstances, Canada and
Mexico evidently perceive the danger of economic domination from the United
States as greater than any monopoly originating outside the continent, and have
adapted their policies accordingly. In this writer's opinion, Canada and (espe-
cially) Mexico are likely to act on the belief that they have more to gain from
staying aloof from a NAEC and relying on bilateral negotiations, government in-
tervention and control, and their own protectionist policies as safeguards against
markets that are concentrated both in the home and the host country and on markets that are character-
ized by high entry barriers. Mergers occuring in such markets are particularly questionable from the
competition policy point of view."
88. Johnson, An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions, 73
J. POL. ECON. 256 (1965).
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monopoly. This attitude stems partly from differences in internal views on the
value of market competition, but even more from the asymmetries in economic
structure which lead to fears of dependence and domination.
